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INTRODUCTION
In Probability Theory the main method of incorpo rating new information is through conditioning. In general, there is no doubt about how to represent ini tial information and how to update it in the light of new observations. However, when we work with pro babilistic intervals, there is a bit of a mess. Several formulas of combining and conditioning are available, the main problem being which formula or method to use in a particular case. The reason for this is the lack of a firm semantic basis.
In this paper we present a method of tackling incom plete probabilistic information, which tries to avoid this kind of ambiguity. The main feature is the clear distinction between evidential and 'a priori' informa tion. Evidential information will be represented as a convex set of likelihood functions with an associated possibility distribution. The interpretation of these possibilities will have a probabilistic basis. However their behavior will be very similar to classical possibil ity distributions (Dubois, Prade 1988; Zadeh 1978) .
We shall discriminate between the combination of ev idential information and the combination of 'a priori' information. Conditioning will be a kind of heteroge neous combination: 'a priori' and evidential informa tion. The result is called 'a posteriori' information. This 'a posteriori' information is different from that resulting from applying known formulas of calculat ing conditional information: Dempster conditioning (Dempster 1967 ) and upper and lower conditioning (Dempster 1967; Campos, Lamata, llforal 1990; Fa gin, Halpern 1990 ).
The problem of applying Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence (Dempster 1967; Shafer 1976 ) to upper and lower probabilities is that there is only one way of com bining information, the so called Dempster rule of com bination. Furthermore, the most used conditioning is Dempster conditioning (Dempster 1967; Moral, Cam pos 1990) which is a particular case of Dempster rule. So all information is combined in an homogeneous way. This gives rise to cases in which Dempster rule seems rea�onable and cases in which the results are not very intuitive. In general, Dempster conditioning produces very narrow intervals, if upper and lower probabilities interpretation is considered (Pearl 1989 ).
'A PRIORI' INFORMATION
Let X be a variable taking values on a finite set U = { u1, ... , Um}. An 'a priori' information about X is a convex set of probabilities,
where { P1, P2, ... P,} is a finite set of probabilities on U. In general, this information is applicable under a determined set of conditions Co under which X takes its values. The meaning is that one element of 1i. is the true probability distribution associated with X, under conditions Co. Given a set of possible probabilities C = {PI, P2, ... Pn}, we may associate a convex set of probabilities with it, its convex hull { n n } C= �a;P; i�a;=l C and C may be considered for the same experiment with different interpretations. For example, let us con sider that we have two urns, ul and u2. ul has 99 red balls and one black. U2 has one red ball and 99 black ones. If we pick up a ball randomly from one of the two urns then, we have two possible probabilities, C = { P1, P2 }, for the color of the ball, one for each urn. However, if the experiment is to select an urn and then pick a ball, the frequencies of the colors will be given by one probability aP1 + (1-a)P2, where
Cl' is the probability of selecting ul , and (1-a) the probability of selecting U2. As a is unknown, we have a convex set of probabilities C. We will always consider the second interpretation. That is, that we have a pre vious experiment consisting in randomly selecting one of the possible probability distributions. Therefore a set of probability distributions will be equivalent. t.o its convex hull.
Above assumption may have some problems . For ex ample, assume that we have two variables, X 1 and X2 , which are known to be independent. For the first vari able we have the convex set of possible probabilities C1 = {P1, Q1}, and for the second variable, the convex set C2 = {P2, Q2}· Given these conditions, the possi ble set of probabilities for the variable X= (X1,X2)
IS
However, this set Cis not nccccsarily convex. \Ve may have:
• Sometimes the convex combination is not equal to a product such as that is, an element from C.
This has been considered also by B. Tessem (1989) , in a slightly different problem: The induced set of prob abilities in X 2 , from a con vex set of 'a priori' distri butions on X, and a convex set of conditionals. It is shown that this set is not necessarily convex.
We shall always represent uncertainty as a convex set. of probabilities. Then, in situations like this, we shall do an approximation of the possible set of probabili ties calculating its convex hull. From a practical point of view, this approximation is equivalent to assuming that the selection of probabilities for X 1 and X 2 may be done in a dependent way. That is, with probabil ity a we may choose P1 for X1 and P2 for X2 ; and with probability 1 -a it is possible to choose Q1 for X1 and Q2 for X2 . This does not imply that the variables X1 and X2 are dependent. In fact, the in dividual probabilities are combined by multiplication (P1.P2 and QJ.Q2). Only the probability distributions are selected on a dependent way. In a particular case, it may occurs that the selection of probabilities is in dependent. But then, we are adding some extra prob abilities. From this point of view, we are losing some information, but we lose it for the sake of simplicity. Convex sets are more manageabl"' than general sets.
The combination of 'a priori' convex sets of prob ability distributions has been considered in Campos, Lamata, Moral (1988) . If we have two 'a priori' con vex sets of probabilities cl and c:J given for t.he same set of conditions, then the conjunction will be the in tersection of the convex hulls, cl IIC2. The disjunction will be the convex hull of t.he union: cl u c2.
This kind of combination is the one applied in situa tions like the following: We know that if we pick up a ball from this urn the probability of being red is be tween 0.75 and 0.85, and from other source we obtain that this probability is between 0.8 and 0.9. Then we may apply this combination (conjunction in this case) and deduce that the probability is between 0.8 and 0.85.
If C1 and C2 are convex sets of probabilities, but rel ative to different contexts C o1 and Co2, then no 'a priori' information may be deduced in the context C o1 U C o2 (both conditions are verified), except if one of the probabilities is degenerated. The following sit uation is perfectly possible:
• C1 ={pi} in conditions Co1, where
• C2 = {p2} in conditions Co2, where
However, if we have the following information,
• Il: "Most of Computer Science students (CS) are single (S)"
• 12: "Most of young people (Y) are single (S)"
Where I1 and 12 may be translated in the probabilistic information,
and nothing is known about the probability of being single UtHler conditions {CS,Y}, then common sense says that in this case it would not be wrong to assume that "Most young people stu ding Computer Science are single". It migth occur that young Computer Sci ence students are a rare combination and most of them are married. But if nothing is said about this, then it may be considered that there are not strange interac tions and that under conditions Co1 and Co2 we may use c3 == cl n c2 == {pi} == {pz}.
In short, to do the combination of 'a priori' proba bilitic convex sets is neccesary to determine whether they are given in the same context. In shuch a case, we calculate the conjunction by the intersection of con vex sets and the disjunction by the convex hull of the union. If the sets of probabilities are given under two different contexts, then nothing can be said about the combination. However, when there is no more avail able information, then the former combination could be considered by default, but taking into account that this is an additional assumption we make about the problem.
Very often, 'a priori' information is given by means of probability intervals or probability envelopes. A probability envelope is a pair of applications such that there exist a family P of probability mea sures verifying
It is clear that given a set of probabilities, C1, we may associate with it a probability envelope. However a probability envelope (I, u) may be defined from differ ent sets of probabilities. But, in every case, there is always a ma. ximal family given by
If C is a set of probabilities and we calculate the asso ciated envelope (I, u), this envelope is equivalent to a maximal family P. Always, we have C <;:; P. Then, if
we transform a set C on an envelope we may consider that some information is lost (there are more proba bilities being possible).
EVIDENTIAL INFORMATION
3.1
LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS
Assume that we do not have an 'a priori' information about X, but we have observed 0, and we have a family of conditional probabilities, P(OIX ==a;), a; E U.
Taking into account that nothing is known about 'a priori' probabilities of a; are not known then nothing can be said about 'a posteriori' probabilities of a; after observing 0, with the exception that if P(Oia;) == 0 then we can conclude that a; is impossible. Cosider the following example: We have U == {a1, a2} and
Then after observing 0, we may have p(a2IO) == 1 (p(a2IO) == 0) if the unknown 'a priori' probability was p(a2) == 1 (p(az) == 0). However, it is clear that after observing 0, a2 should be considered less possible than a1. In conclussion the information provided by 0 can not be represented by probabilities or interval probabilities. We shall do as in Clasical Non-Bayesian Statistics and say that 0 defines a likelihood function, 10, on U, which is a mapping from U on the interval [0, 1], given by lo(a;) == P(OIX ==a;), a; E U.
This likelihood may be interpreted as a possibility distribution, 11'0, which is not neccesarily normalized (Smets 1982).
The possibility measure associated with 1r 0 is defined (Zadeh 1978) as a mapping given by
The following proposition relates a possibility measure with probability bounds.
Proposition.-Given a possibility measure ITo on U, then ITo(A) 2: P(O n A) and these bounds are optimal under information 0.
Proof.-
Now, taking into account that, L p(a;) = P(A)::; 1, aiEA we get the required inequality, P(O n A) ::0 max 7r0(a;) =ITo( A).
a,EA
The bounds are optimal in the sense that being then, if we may consider the 'a priori' probability -p(a;) = 0, othenvise
With this 'a priori' probability,
that is, equality is given.
• These bounds are not associated with conditional probabilities, P(.IO), but with probabilities of consis tency with information 0. To consider real conditional probabilities we have to divide by P(O), but this prob ability is unknown, and we only have an upper bound IT0(U). The normalization by this value may be con sidered as an upper relative degree of consistency,
From this upper value, we may define the lower limit as go,(A) = 1-go'(A).
CONVEX SETS OF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS
On the other hand, it is possible that the exact val ues of conditional probabilities are not known. For example, we only have probability intervals b; ::; P(OIX =a;) ::; c;
In this case, observation 0 does not define only one likelihood function, but a convex set of likelihoods, those verifying a; ::=; l( a;) ::=; c; . This convex set will be called the evidential information associated with 0 and denote it by E0• An evidential information also has an associated pos This possibility distribution also verifies a similar pro position to the above, relative to probability bounds. In the same way, we may associate the pair of lower upper measures (go, go ' ).
With the same reasoning as in 'a priori' information, it will be considered that a set of likelihood functions, E, is equivalent to its convex hull, E. A special likelihood function is the null likelihood, IN , defined as This likelihood function comes from an observation, 0, for which P(Oia;) = 0 are possible conditional probabilities (there may be an other possible conditional probabilities defining other likelihood functions associated with observation 0).
It is clear that after observing 0, these conditional probabilities are impossible, because we have In the following, the convex set E U {IN} will be de noted as C( E).
The disjunction and conjunction of evidential informa tion are defined in an analogous way to the disjunction and conjunction of 'a priori' information.
If E1 and E2 are two sets of evidential information, the disjunction, E1 V E2 , is defined as C(E1 U E2). The conjunction, E1 1\ E2 , is defined as the intersection of the couvex hulls:
Here is important to distinguish between the conjunc tion of evidential information, C(E1) II C(E2) and the evidential observation associated with the conjunc tion of two observations 01 and 02, Eo,AO,· The first is applied when we know that E1 and E2 are two convex sets of likelihood functions associated with the same observation and is performed calculating C(E1) n C(E2) . The last, when we have two sets of likelihoods corresponding to two observations, 01 and 02, and we want to calculate the evidential informa tion associated with 01 1\ 02. The same is applied for the disjunction.
For the calculus of evidential information E o , A O, from the evidential information Eo, and Eo,, we have to calculate the possible values for the probability P( 01/\ Ozlai) from the values of P(01Ia;) and P(02Ia;). The only thing we can say is that max {0, P(01Ia;) + P(02Ia;)-1}::; P(01 /\ 02la;)::;
::; min {P(01Iai), P(02Ia;)} then we have to consider in E o , 1\0, all the likelihood functions, I, verifying
For the associated possibility distribution, we get Jro,Ao, (a ; ) =min {1ro, (a;), Jro,(a;)} that is, the same formula as in classical Possibility Theory (Dubois, Prade 1988) , but without assuming any additional assumption of coherence or compatibil ity of observations.
If we assume that 01 and 02 are conditionally inde pendent given the value of X then we get:
Jro,Ao,(a;) = Jro,(a;).Jro,(a;).
Another assumptions may be make to obtain different combination formulas for operations on observations.
COMBINATION OF 'A PRIORI' AND EVIDENTIAL INFORMA TION
Here, it is considered the combination of a con vex set of 'a priori' probabilities, C, with an evidential infor mation, E. The method is a generalization of Bayes Theorem and is based on the formula of conditioning in Moral, Campos (1990) . The generalization given here is different from the one given by Smets (1978 Smets ( , 1981 . The main difference comes from the fact that we assume that an observation defines a consonant ev idence (a possibility) and Smets works with general evidential information. Also, in our approach, we dis tinguish between evidential and 'a priori' information using different methods according to the particular sit uation.
The combination of a probability measure p about the values of X and a possibility associated with obser vation 0 7r0(a;) = p(OIX = a;), is given by the function, h (a;) = p(a;).7r0(a;).
We shall denote this function h by p x 1!'0• After normalization, h determines the values of conditional probability,
The normalization factor may be considered as the likelihood of the 'a priori' probability given 0. A very small likelihood of h may make us suspect the initial values of probability and therefore, the resulting con ditional probabilities. Furthermore, in this case these values will be very sensitive to the lack of accuracy of initial probabilities.
The above expression is precisely Bayes formula, de veloped in two stages: first combination and after nor malization. In a similar way, we shall define the com bination of an 'a priori' convex set of probability dis tributions and an evidential information Eo as the set,
As before, and by analogous reasons we shall assume that two combination sets, Hi and H2, are equivalent if C(Hi) = C(H2).
To assign probability intervals (Moral, Campos 1990) to the set H we select the extreme points of H, hi, ... , h n . Each h k different from the null function can define a probability value, normalizing it by its likelihood,
We could now calculate the upper and lower probabil ity values by means of the expression,
This is equivalent to upper-lower conditioning (Demp ster 1967; Fagin, Halpern 1990) . But in this method there is some missing information. In effect, given that hk is the true combination, then in this case, the prob ability of observation 0 is L j hk(aj ). According to our definition of possibility, this defines a possibility about the combination functions and the corresponding con ditional probabilities, given by
That is, we do not only have a set of conditional prob abilities, we also have a possibility about them. This possibility also defines upper and lower probabilities: If D <;::: { pi(.JO), ... ,pm(.JO)}, then It is important to point out that the result of the com bination is the set H, not the intervals. For exam ple, we may have the same intervals coming from pure possibilistic information or a convex set of probability distributions. However, after combining each one of them with new information, the intervals may become very different. The following example illustrates these ideas.
Example.-Let us consider a set U = { 1, 2, 3} and an obsevation Oi such that
The intervals defined by this observation are
Now assume that we have a convex set of probability distributions, C, with extreme points Example.-Assume as above that we have two urns U1 and U2 with red and black balls· . These intervals incorporate not only the changes on conditonal probabilities but also our chages on belief about the urns, that is, the bayesian updating and the likelihood information.
